Suzuki Samurai :: Car Automobile Marketing Market

Suzuki Samurai In 1985, locomote conjunction Suzuki was entering the American automobile foodstuff with the Suzuki Samurai, a lightweight off-road four-wheeled drive vehicle. A dilemma that the American Suzuki Motor Corporation (ASMC) was face up with was exactly how to position the Samurai in the American market. There were several options for them to do this, each of which had unique advantages and disadvantages, however only one that would effectively maximize the gross revenue potential for the Samurai.The first option was to position the Samurai as a bid utility vehicle (SUV). The Samurai already had the look of a mini-jeep, and already had four-wheel drive capabilities. Standing out from every last(predicate) other SUVs, the Samurai was smaller, lighter, and less(prenominal) costly suggested retail was about half the price of the average SUV. Leanord Pearstein, chief executive officer of a competing advertising agency, preferred to portray the Samurai as a punk r ocker little cheap Jeep. Those who had already purchased the automobile had also considered buying a Jeep or other sport utility vehicles.In 1985, the sport utility vehicle market was very small. Less than 3% of automobile sales in the United States in 1985 came from SUV sales. Douglas Mazza, who headed the Samurai operation in the US, had a goal to sell 30,000 units within two years, which would exceed all SUV sales in 1984.The second option was to position the Samurai as a shrink lam truck. The market share was two and a half measure the compact SUV market. This would make it easier for Suzuki to enter is they positioned the vehicle in this way. In the pickup truck market itself, Japanese trucks sold very well they accounted for 54% of total compact pickup truck sales. If they wanted to introduce the Samurai as a truck it would be more versatile and less expensive than a subcompact car.Since custom regulations for compact pickup trucks state that thither must be a 25% ta riff on all trucks imported in to the US, this is ten times the amount the tariff would be for a car. Pearlstein believed that even with the high tariff it would be worth stipendiary in the long run, however this is still a significant cost. some other positioning strategy was to sell the Samurai as a subcompact car. This market was considerably larger than the previously stated markets. Pearlstein suggested that they should market this as an election to the dull automobile, a compact car with a cuter look.